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INTERVENTION AND THE MEANING OF "BOUND"
UNDER FEDERAL RULE 24(a)(2)*
INTERVENTION is the procedural device enabling a third person to enter
and to become a party to an action or proceeding.' It is generally desired to
protect interests which may be at stake 2 or to save the time and expense that
would be involved in an independent action.3 Rule 24 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure governs the usual cases of intervention in federal practice.
4
It attempts to reconcile the demands of the intervenor with the traditional
right of the original litigants to be free of outside interference.5 Rule 24(a)
*Clark v. Sandusky, 205 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1953).
1. See, e.g., Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U.S. 317, 330-1 (1912) ; First Nat'l Bank v. M &
G Convoy, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 494 (W.D. Pa. 1952) ; In re Willacy County Water Control
and Improvement Dist., 36 F. Supp. 36 (S.D. Tex. 1940). For an extensive discussion of
intervention, see 4 MooRE, FEDEML PRAcricE 1 24 et seq. (2d ed. 1950) (hereinafter cited
as MooRE).
2. See, e.g., Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Carolina Peanut Co., 186 F.2d 816 (4th
Cir. 1951) ; United States v. E. I. DuPont & Co., 13 F.R.D. 487 (N.D. Ill. 1953); First
Nat'l Bank v. M & G Convoy, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 494 (W.D. Pa. 1952).
3. See 4 MooRa 124.10; Note, Intervention of Private Parties Under Federal Ride 24,
52 COL. L. Rxv. 922 (1952).
4. See, e.g., Root Refining Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 169 F.2d 514, 524 (3d
Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 912 (1949) ; United States v. E. I. du Pont & Co., 13
F.R.D. 487 (N.D. Ill. 1953) ; Tolliver v. Cudahy Packing Co., 39 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Tenn.
1941.). Yet Rule 24 is not "a comprehensive inventory of the allowable instances for inter-
vention." Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 312 U.S. 502, 505 (1941). This
was an antitrust action in which intervention was granted as a matter of right according
to the terms of a consent decree naming the applicant as one who should be heard under
specified circumstances. Compare System Federation No. 91 v. Reed, 180 F.2d 991, 998
(6th Cir. 1950) (intervention granted where the consent decree protected all members of
the applicant's class, although intervention was not specifically provided for), with Allen
Calculators v. National Cash Register Co., 322 U.S. 137, 141 (1944) (intervention denied
because consent decree failed to provide for it). See also Socidt6, etc. v. McGrath, 17 F.R.
Serv. 24a.2, case 3 (D.D.C. 1952) (an alternative ground for granting intervention was
that the case was highly unusual; Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co. v. United States, .rupra,
was cited).
Rule 24, although applicable to some cases of intervention in bankruptcy proceedings,
yields to §§ 206-07 of the Bankruptcy Law when there is a conflict. In re Bender Body Co.,
2 F.R.D. 413 (N.D. Ohio 1942). Bankruptcy represents a special category of intervention
problems. See 4 Moon f24.11.
For discussion of intervention in state practice, see CLARK, CODE PLEADI NG 420-23 (2d
ed. 1947) ; Note, 25 VA. L. Rav. 606 (1939).
5. See Berger, Intervention by Public Agencies in Private Litigation in the Federal
Courts, 50 YALE L.J. 65 (1940). Intervention is the child of continental doctrines of equity.
See Note, 25 VA. L. Rav. 606 (1939). It was unknown to early common law; the plain-
tiff enjoyed complete control of his action. See 2 CHirrY, GENERAL PRAC"icE 493-4 (1835).
The influence of this concept has been felt in this century in jurisdictions which have not
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sets forth the requirements for "intervention of right."0 It serves a protective
function for the applicant who may be injured unless heard in the action.7
Out of fairness to the applicant, considerations of procedural efficiency and of
inconvenience to the original parties are prohibited from influencing the de-
cision as to intervention of right.8 But these considerations do come into
play under 24(b), which governs "permissive" intervention.0 Even when not
necessary for protection, intervention is often desirable to settle all related
controversies, as far as possible, in one action.i ° And 24(b) gives the trial
judge broad discretion to weigh in each case the various factors affecting
trial convenience and fairness.
11
Most cases of intervention of right arise under Rule 24(a) (2) because of
adopted the union of law and equity. See, e.g., Consolidated Liquor Co. v. Scotello & Nizzi,
21 N.M. 485, 494-5, 155 Pac. 109, 1093 (1916), where the court said that, "[tlhe funda-
mental principle underlying legal procedure is that parties to a controversy shall have the
right to litigate the same free from the interference of strangers.'
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a) provides: "Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted
to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional
right to intervene; or (2) when the representation of the applicant's interest by e.nisting
parties is or may be inadequate and the applicant is or may be bound by a judgment in the
action; or (3) when the applicant is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution
or other disposition of property which is in the custody or subject to the control or dis-
position of the court or an officer thereof."
7. See Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Carolina Peanut Co., 186 F2d 816 (4th Cir.
1951) ; 4 MooR 1 24.07; 7 CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PRocrnuRE 1124.08 (3d ed. 1951).
8. See Berger, supra note 5, at 65.
9. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b) provides: "Upon timely application anyone may be permitted
to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers a conditional
right to intervene; or (2) vhen an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have
a question of law or fact in common.... In exercising its discretion the court shall con-
sider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights
of the original parties." See note 11 infra.
10. See United States v. American Surety Co., 142 F.2d 726 (2d Cir. 1944). Elimina-
tion of multiplicity of actions is a general policy of the Federal Rules. Wheaton, Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure Interpreted, 25 CORN. L.Q. 23, 29 (1939) ; Willis, Procedure ir
Patent Cases under the Kea, Federal Rules, 30 GEo. L.J. 348, 353 (1942). Rule 24(b)
should be-and is-liberally construed in order to carry out this policy. Western States
Machine Co. v. S. S. Hepworth Co., 2 F.R.D. 145 (E.D.N.Y. 1941). Professor Moore
has stated that "in many cases where intervention might be denied as an absolute right, it
would seem desirable that the trial court exercise its discretion and allow intervention."
4 MOORE 11 24.08.
11. See, e.g., Allen Calculators v. National Cash Register Co., 32- U.S. 137 (1944)
(intervention denied where representation adequate, the issues thoroughly e.xplored and the
case would otherwise be delaved) ; Kind v. Markham, 7 F.R.D. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1945)
(intervention denied because it would complicate the case and shed no new light on it) ;
Utica, C. & S.V. Ry. v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., S F.R. Serv. 24a.2, case 3 (N.D.N.Y.
1945) (intervention denied where it would involve unwarranted interference in corporate
affairs of the original parties). See also Heard in FEDERAL RuLEs oF Cmi. Proc.ounc,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE AT VASHINGTON, D.C. 136 (1939). For a discussion of
Rule 24(b), see Commentary, 3 F.R. Serv. 704 (1940).
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its generalized scope.12 It provides for intervention "when the representation
of the applicant's interest by existing parties is or may be inadequate and the
applicant is or may be bound by a judgment in the action."'13 Although the
word "bound" denotes the crucial prerequisite to intervention of right,14 it
has not been accorded careful judicial analysis.',
It is generally held that an applicant may be "bound" within the meaning
of Rule 24(a) (2) only when he may be subject to res judicata.10 This can
12. Rule 24(a) (1) and Rule 24(a) (3) are limited to special situations. See note 6
supra. Rule 2 4(a) (2) "purports to confer an additional right of intervention." Berger,
supra note 5, at 87.
Only intervention by private parties under Rule 24(a) (2) is discussed in this Note;
for treatment of intervention by Government agencies, see Berger, sapra note 5.
13. Cameron v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 157 F.2d 993 (1st Cir.
1946) ; MacDonald v. United States, 119 F.2d 821. (9th Cir. 1941), inodified on other
grounds mb nor. Great Northern R.R. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262 (1942) ; Tolliver
v. Cudahy Packing Co., 39 F. Supp. 3-37 (E.D. Tenn. 1941) ; see note 6 supra.
14. Although the applicant must also make timely application and show that the repre-
sentation of his interest may be inadequate, it is customary first to inquire whether he may
be bound. See, e.g., Sutphen Estates, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 19 (1951); Cameron
v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 157 F.2d 993 (1st Cir. 1946); Wolpe v.
Poretsky, 144 F.2d 505 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 777 (1944). See also United
States v. Columbia Gas & Electric Corp., 27 F. Supp. 116 (D. Del. 1939), quoted in note
16 infra. "The absolute right to intervene under F.R. 24(a) (2) is predicated on the fact
that the petitioner will be bound by a decree of the court before which he is not adequately
represented." CLARK, CODE PLEADING 425 (2d ed. 1947).
15. See 7 CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDEVRAL PROCEDURE 124.16 (3d ed. 1951). Courts often treat
Rule 24 briefly, e.g., American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit
Co., 1.12 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1940) ; Palmer v. Guaranty Trust Co., 111 F.2d 115 (2d Cir.
1940)-and sometimes cryptically, e.g., Deauville Associates, Inc. v. Eristavi-Tehitcherine,
173 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1949).
16. E.g., Sutphen Estates, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 19 (1951) ; Innis, Speiden
& Co. v. Food Machinery Corp., 2 F.R.D. 261 (D. Del. 1942); Owen v. Paramount Pro-
ductions, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 557 (S.D. Cal. 1941). "A natural meaning would of course be
that [the words 'is or may be bound by a judgment in the action'] imply res judicata." 7
CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE 1 24.16 (3d ed. 1951).
Because of the difficulty in many instances of foretelling whether or not the decree will
be res judicata against the applicant, intervention should be granted, if other prerequisites
are met, whenever there is a possibility of res judicata. Innis, Speiden & Co. v. Food
Machinery Corp., supra, at 265. Cf. Cameron v. President and Fellows of Harvard College,
157 F.2d 993, 996 (1st Cir. 1946). For an overly cautious approach resulting in mis-
application of this principle, see Soci6t6, etc. v. McGrath, 17 F.R. Serv. 24a,2, case 3 (D.D.C.
1952).
The equating of bound with res judicata is sometimes expressed in terms of represen.
tation. Rule 24(a) (2) "relates to cases in which the applicant for intervention has an
interest in the action represented by a party so that the applicant may be bound by a
judgment in the action. The question of adequacy of representation does not arise unless
the applicant is represented in the action." United States v. Columbia Gas & Electric
Corp., 27 F. Supp. 116, 119 (D. Del. 1939). It is generally said that 24(a) (2) is thus
limited in its application to technical representative actions, such as the true and hybrid
class suits provided for in Rule 23 (a), which also refers to adequate representation. CLARK,
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happen in two situations: where the applicant's rights are derived from the
same source as a litigant's and he raises the same issues' 7 as, for example,
when he is a stockholder attempting to intervene in a derivative suit against
his corporation ;1s or where he is a privy of a litigant,10 as when he is the
assignee of one who, by the assignment, violated an injunction. -0 The rationale
is that the protection afforded by intervention of right is not essential to one
who will have another legal remedy available after judgment.2
CODE PLEADING 425 n.295 (2d ed. 1947) ; 4 Moore 1124.08 n.1; Note, 55 Htnv. L R.Et
264 n.27 (1941). This was the intent of the framers. See Clark in FnEA. RuzTLs oF CIVIL
PROCEDURE, PROCEDINGS OF THE ISTITUrTE AT CLEVELAND 266 (1938). But, for the view
that 24(a) (2) applies to one who is totally unrepresented as well as to one represented
to some degree, see Berger, supra note 5, at 86.
17. E.g., System Federation No. 91 v. Reed, 180 F.2d 991 (6th Cir. 1950) (where ap-
plicants are non-union employees and non-union co-workers sue to enforce their rights
under the union's contract with their employer) ; Wolpe v. Poretsky, 144 F.2d 505 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 777 (1944) (where applicants are property owners whose
neighbors sue to void a zoning ordinance). See cases cited note IS infra.
A decision cannot be res judicata for the applicant if the issues he seeks to raise are
dissimilar from those of the litigant; he is not bound since he is not represented in the
action. 'Mullins v. DeSoto Securities Co., 2 F.R.D. 502, 504 (W.D. La. 1942), appeal dis-
misscd, 136 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1943). See United States v. Columbia Gas & Electric Corp.,
27 F. Supp. 116 (D. Del. 1939), quoted in note 16 supra.
18. E.g., Thompson v. Broadfoot, 165 F.2d 744 (2d Cir. 1948); Malcolm v. Cities
Service Co., 2 F.R.D. 405 (D. Del. 1942). But not every derivative suit raises the same
issues as the stockholder-petitioner seeks to litigate; where they are dissimilar, petitioner
cannot be bound. See note 17 supra.
19. E.g., Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Carolina Peanut Co., 1l3 F2d 816 (4th Cir.
1951) (where, as insurer, petitioner has indemnified the insured who sues to recover from
the tort-feasor) ; Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 934 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 761 (1947) (where petitioner is a stockholder of a corporation involved in litiga-
tion) ; United States v. American Surety Co., 142 F.2d 726 (2d Cir. 1944) (where petitioner
receives notice of a suit to be begun against his surety) ; Otis Elevator Co. v. Standard
Construction Co., 10 F.R.D. 404 (D. Minn. 1950) (where petitioner's agent is sued in his
capacity as agent) ; Innis, Speiden & Co. v. Food Machinery Corp., 2 F.R.D. 261 (D. Del.
1942) (where petitioner is an exclusive area licensee whose patentee sues another for in-
fringement).
For a confusing and dubious application of Rule 24(a) (2), see Kaufman v. Sociit6, etc.,
343 U.S. 156 (1952), where the Supreme Court held that non-enemy stockholders of a foreign
corporation suing the Alien Property Custodian to recover assets vested on the theory it
was enemy-dominated might be "bound" by the judgment, even though the Court declared
that such non-enemy stockholders had a severable interest in the assets seized. For an
analysis of this complicated case, see Comment, 62 YALn J. 1210, 1223 (1953).
For cases where intervention of right vas denied because the applicant was not a privy
of a litigant, see, e.g., Sutphen Estates, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 19 (1951) ; Cameron
v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 157 F2d 993 (1st Cir. 1946) ; Innis, Speiden
& Co. v. Food Machinery Corp., 2 F.R.D. 261 (D. Del. 1942).
20. Deauville Associates, Inc. v. Eristavi-Tchitcherine, 173 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1949).
21, See, e.g., Sutphen Estates, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 19 (1951); Cameron
v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 157 F.2d 993 (1st Cir. 1946); White v.
Hanson, 126 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1942); Republic of Italy v. DeAngelis, IS F.R. Serv.
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Arguments that a judgment's practical effect will be highly prejudicial
generally fail to convince courts to give "bound" a less rigorous meaning
than res judicata. For example, the Supreme Court has held that an antitrust
decree splitting the corporate defendant and reducing the assets which guaran-
teed the applicant's long-term lease to defendant's subsidiary did not "bind"
the applicant.22 Where the amount of work given railroad firemen varied in-
versely with that given engineers, the firemen's union would not be directly
"bound" by the judgment determining the amount of time engineers may
work.23 And in a suit to enjoin violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act,
milk haulers claiming to be independent contractors would not be "bound" by
a decision that they were employees of the defendant, even though this might
destroy the market value of their milk routes.
24
24a.2, case 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). Cf. Wolpe v. Poretsky, 144 F.2d 505 (D.C. Cir.), cerl.
denied, 323 U.S. 777 (1944) (intervention granted because judgment would take away the
applicant's right to an independent action) ; American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. Inter-
borough Rapid Transit Co., 3 F.R.D. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (same). See Berger, supra
note 5, at 65.
This is a carry-over from practice prior to Rule 24. Intervention was governed by
Federal Equity Rule 37, which provided: "Anyone claiming an interest in the litigation
may at any time be permitted to assert his right by intervention, but the intervention shall be
in subordination to, and in recognition of, the propriety of the main proceeding." Despite
the statute's permissive wording, appellate courts recognized intervention of right, often
describing it in terms of abuse of discretion. Although they were sometimes confused, the
vital factor in granting or denying the absolute right seems to have been the non-existence
of another remedy. See, e.g., Jenkins Petroleum Process Co. v. Credit Alliance Corp., 83
F.2d 532 (10th Cir. 1936); Richfield Oil Co. v. Western Machinery Co., 279 Fed. 853
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 260 U.S. 723 (1922) ; United States Trust Co. v. Chicago Terminal
Transfer Co., 188 Fed. 292 (7th Cir. 1911). See also Wham, Intervention in Federal
Equity Cases, 17 A.B.A.J. 160, 161 (1931); Willis, supra note 10, at 356; Commentary,
3 F.R. Serv. 704 (1.940).
Rule 24 explicitly recognized intervention of right, as well as permissive intervention,
and dropped the limitation that both be in subordination to the original suit. As a corollary
to the bound requirement of 24(a) (2), it has been held that the trial judge's exercise of
discretion under 24(b) (2) will not be reviewed except where the applicant has no other
adequate Temedy. Cresta Blanca Wine Co. v. Eastern Wine Corp., 143 F.2d 1012 (2d Cir.
1944) ; Palmer v. Guaranty Trust Co., 111 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1940). Thus the fate of the
applicant still turns upon the existence of another remedy.
22. Sutphen Estates, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 19 (1951). The majority, speak-
ing through Mr. Justice Douglas, denied intervention under 24(a) (2) because of petitioner's
lack of privity with defendant. It saw "ample reason to prevent the administration of the
decree from being burdened with a collateral issue that on this record can &)ropcrly be
adjudicated elsewhere." Id. at 23.
23. See Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R.R., 34 F.
Supp. 594, 596 (E.D. Wisc. 1940).
24. Durkin v. Pet Milk Co., 14 F.R.D. 374 (W.D. Ark. 1953). The court stated that
the "movants may be indirectly affected by a judgment ... but they will not be 'bound' by
the judgment in the sense contemplated by the Rule." Id. at 378. Because it recognized
the practical effect which judgment might have upon the petitioners, the court permitted
them to appear as arnicus curiae in order to obtain representation by their own counsel.
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But a few cases have granted intervention under Rule 24(a) (2) where
judgment could not be res judicata as to the applicant. A company official
obligated to reimburse an insurer for all moneys paid out on its guarantee of
the company's performance had "a vital interest" in the outcome of a suit
against the insurer and the company for nonperformance because he would "in
the last analysis . .. [be bound] indirectly."23 Judgment against the defen-
dants would render him ultimately liable unless he could show fraud, collusion,
or failure to defend the suit properly.26 And where certificate holders sued the
management of a trust estate containing cemetery property, a cemetery lot
holder had an absolute right to intervene for purposes of appeal and re-trial
when a decree replaced the trustees and enjoined all persons from interfering
with the management of the new trustees and from suing the trust estate with-
out leave of court.2 7 The Third Circuit stated that the petitioner's rights were
"affected" by the decree since it purported to prevent him from freely assert-
ing the prior lien of lot holders on a fund established for certificate holders.P5
This practical approach to intervention of right has been supported by a
few authorities..2 9 However, believing that the absolute right should not de-
This, it said, gave them all the advantages of intervention. Id. at 331. See also Kind v.
Markham, 7 F.R.D. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1945); Ocean S.S. Co. v. Allen, 36 F. Supp. 851
(M.D. Ga. 1941).
For other cases where intervention was denied because judgment could not be res judi-
cata as to the applicant, see, e.g., Allen Calculators, Inc. v. National Cash Register Co.,
322 U.S. 137 (1944) ; United States v. General Electric Co., 95 F. Supp. 165 (D.N.J. 1950) ;
Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Thompson, 8 F.R.D. 96 (E.D. Mo. 1948); Jewell Ridge Coal
Corp. v. UMW, 3 F.R.D. 251 (W.D. Va. 1943); Keystone Freight Lines, Inc. v. Pratt
Thomas Truck Lines, Inc., 37 F. Supp. 635 (W.D. Okla.), appeal dismissed sub nora.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Keystone Freight Lines, Inc., 123 F.2d 326
(10th Cir. 1941).
25. United States v. C. M. Lane Lifeboat Co., 25 F. Supp. 410 (E.D.N.Y. 1933), aff'd
on other grounds, 118 F.2d 793 (2d Cir.), appeal dimnissed, 314 U.S. 579 (1941).
In Tatum v. Cardillo, 11 F.R.D. 5S5 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), an employer and its insurer
were granted intervention under 24(a) (2) in an action by an employee to review a com-
missioner's order under a compensation act, because they would be liable for any award
made in his favor and could therefore be adversely affected by the judgment. Id. at 526. Cf.
Knapp v. Hankins, 106 F. Supp. 43 (E.D. Ill. 1952). But see Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R.R., 34 F. Supp. 594 (E.D. Wis. 1940), where
the court declined to follow the C. M. Lane indirectly bound interpretation of 24(a) (2).
"Such a construction would be quite a strain on the meaning of the words... ." Id. at 596.
The court permitted intervention under 24(b) (2). Had this approach been employed in
the Lane and Taturn cases, the desired result could have been achieved easily without rezort
to 24(a) (2). In this sense the language of a trial judge granting intervention under
24(a) (2) may be considered gratuitous, for in all such cases he may permit it in the exercise
of his discretion. See First National Bank v. M & G Convoy, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 494 (W.D.
Pa. 1952) ; Indian Refining Co. v. Dallman, 2 F.R. Serv. 24b2, case 3 (S.D. IlL 1940).
26. United States v. C. M. Lane Lifeboat Co., supra note 25.
27. Mack v. Passaic National Bank & Trust Co., 150 F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1945).
28. Id. at 476-7.
29. See Berger, supra note 5, at 65 n.4.
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pend solely upon the non-existence of another remedy and that courts should
consider the efficacy of other remedies and the injury which may occur if
intervention is denied, they suggest an application of 24(a) (2) even broader
than that found in the cases. They offer vague formulae providing for inter-
vention of right whenever the applicant's interests are "seriously jeopardized"' 0
or "the effect of the judgment would be prejudicial." 1
In the recent case of Clark v. Sandusky 32 the Seventh Circuit granted in-
tervention of right to one who could not have been harmed by the judgment
either legally or practically, in an overreaching application of the "prejudicial
effect" definition of "bound." Negro citizens were suing the town of Cicero
and its police officers for violation of their constitutional rights. They asked
for an injunction against further interference with their alleged right of occu-
pancy of an apartment building and for $200,000 damages. Plaintiffs alleged
that they leased the apartment and attempted to install their furniture but that
defendants prevented them, by assault, abuse, and threats, from entering the
premises. Mrs. Camille DeRose applied for leave to intervene as of right before
trial. She claimed to be owner of both the building and the furniture and
alleged that plaintiffs had no property interest in either. She asked judgment
against both plaintiffs and defendants on the ground that her building had
been damaged and boarded up on court order and her furniture destroyed as
a result of plaintiffs' conspiracy to foment civil strife combined with the acts
of defendants. The district court denied the application, 3 but the Seventh
Circuit reversed on appeal.3 4 The court recognized that the judgment could
not bind Mrs. DeRose and that she would in fact be free to assert her claims in
an independent action against all the original parties. 85 Nevertheless, it held
she was entitled to intervene under Rule 24(a) (2) because her rights "may
well be substantially prejudiced" if not heard.3 0
30. Ibid.
31. 7 CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURz 1124.16 (3d ed. 1951). The editors reject
24(a) (2)'s "natural meaning" of res judicata-see stpra note IS--for "a more rational
point of view for the purposes at stake," which construes the words is or may be bound so
that "they merely carry into present practice the orthodox requirement of intervention
practice generally that the nature of the intervenor's interest must be such that he will
gain or lose by the operation of the judgment."
32. 205 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1953).
33. Clark v. Sandusky, Civil No. 51-C-951, N.D. Ill., February 2, 1953.
34. Clark v. Sandusky, 205 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1953).
35. Id. at 918.
36. Id. at 919. Judge Lindley admitted "some difficulty" with the requirement that Mrs.
DeRose be bound. However, he found that she met the requirement of inadequale repre-
sentation "unquestionably" because "she asserts a claim adverse to both plaintiffs and de-
fendants. ... Thus she is not represented by any of the original parties and is clearly within
the purview of the Rule." Id. at 918. For support he cited Deauville Associates, Inc. v.
Eristavi-Tchitcherine, 173 F.2d 745, 746 (5th Cir. 1949). See supra note 20. Language in
that opinion, after establishing that the petitioner would be bound because of privity, implied
that no representation is inadequate representation. This illustrates why Professor Moore
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jLittle quarrel may be had with those few cases granting intervention of
right where the judgment, although not conclusive of petitioner's legal status,
could leave him at a practical disadvantageaT But the facts of the Clark case
seem not to bring it within that category. The court pointed out that Mrs.
DeRose claimed the property involved and that this property vas badly damaged
or destroyed. From this it concluded that she "will certainly be materially
affected if she is not permitted to participate in the action and assert her
claim .... ,,as It is difficult to understand how she could be so affected, especial-
ly when, by the court's own admission, 0 no practical obstacles prevented the
use of her independent remedy against all the parties.&4
Extension of intervention of right to those cases in which it is not imperative
for purposes of protection will unnecessarily limit the flexibility of Rule 24.41
It will seriously curtail the discretion of the trial court by requiring it to grant
intervention without further inquiry in many cases which presently fall under
24(b). Upon a minimal showing of interest by the applicant, the trial judge
will be foreclosed from taking into account the most expeditious manner of
handling the particular action, the effect of intervention on the rights of the
original parties, or any similar considerations.
states that it is preferable to approach 24(a) (2) in terms of bound than in terms of repre-
sentation of an interest, a hazier concept. 4 Moonn , 24.OS and n.7.
An applicant is represented within the meaning of Rule 24(a) (2) when the interest
which he wants to assert is already before the court. See Campbell, Jurisdeliion a:d Vcn:ac
Aspects of Intervention under Federal Rule 24, 7 U. or Pirr. L REv. 1, 9 (1940). In this
sense if he is not represented to some degree, he is not eligible to intervene. See note 15
sapra. Thus, id Sutphen Estates, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 19 (1951), the Supreme
Court held that 24 (a) (2) could not apply where the petitioner's interest was adverse to the
interests of the parties. See note 21 supra. The Seventh Circuit drew the opposite con-
clusion from a similar situation. Misconstruction of representation led it to extend 24(a) (2)
far beyond the class action typical of its intended application.
37. See case cited note 27 supra and accompanying text.
38. Clark v. Sandusky, 205 F.2d 915, 918-19 (7th Cir. 1953).
39. See te--t at note 35 supra.
40. By granting intervention of right when the applicant had another adequate remedy
available, the Seventh Circuit held squarely against the long line of authority suggested
by the cases cited in the first paragraph of note 21 supra.
41. This would be contrary to one of the purposes of the Federal Rules, which were
designed to promote procedural flexibility. See 2 MlooRE 1.03; Wheaton, supra note 10,
at 29.
42. Although it is often assumed that allowance of intervention cannot hinder trial
procedure nor harm the original litigants, there has been some judicial rccognition to the
contrary. "There is a general practice in this and other Federal Courts to take a liberal
view towards motions to intervene, upon the apparent assumption that no substantial harm
results from the granting of such motions. It is apparently felt that if the intervenor does
not have a substantial right or interest in the proceedings, the ultimate disposition of the
case will eliminate him without injury to the principal parties. This court feels, however,
that petitions or motions to intervene should be carefully scrutinized and granted only in
cases in which there is either a legal right to intervene or in cases in which the motion
definitely establishes that the petitioner has some interest or right which will not be ade-
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This weakening of the discretionary authority of the trial court will be
coupled with an inevitable increase in the work of appellate courts. The more
ambiguous and expansive the criteria for intervention of right, the greater
the temptation for unsuccessful applicants to appeal. Although there can be
no objection to adding to the burden of the courts when positive justification
exists, such justification is lacking here.
48
And broad application of Rule 24(a) (2) will impose hardship upon the
original parties. Rule 24(b) commands the court in the exercise of its dis-
cretion to consider whether or not intervention will unduly delay or prejudice
their rights.44 Since the expansion of 24(a) necessarily means the contraction
of 24(b), original litigants will be deprived of the opportunity to have their
interests affect the decision on intervention in more cases than under the
present interpretation. They frequently will be burdened with interjection of
other parties and other issues where previously they were unencumbered.
46
When intervention is denied by the trial judge, the greater number of appeals
encouraged by the Clark criterion will aggravate the dilemma of the parties-
whether to defend against the appeal, spending additional resources before
trial on the merits, or to resign themselves to the probability of losing control
of the suit.46 And even if the intervenor loses his appeal, the action is often
quately protected or enforced unless intervention is granted." Tamm, J., in Socicht, etc.
v. McGrath, 90 F. Supp. 1011, 1012 (D.D.C. 1950), appeal dismnissed Sub norn. Kaufman
v. Socit6, etc., 188 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1951), rev'd on other grounds, 343 U.S. 156
(1952). Judge Learned Hand recognized that certain "practical considerations" such as
"the danger of confusion arising from the presence of too many parties, and the possible
increases in the allowances and costs" might influence a trial judge to deny intervention.
Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Kelby, 125 F.2d 650, 655 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 697
(1942). See also cases cited note 11 supra.
43. Appellate review of such questions would result in the mere substitution of one
opinion for another with respect to a controversial, but relatively unimportant, question of
fact. Where this is the case, it is good policy to leave the decision to the trial judge.
"Plainly enough, the circumstances under which interested outsiders should be allowed to
become participants in a litigation is, barring very special circumstances, a matter for the
nisi prius court." Frankfurter, J., in Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 312
U.S. 502, 506 (1941).
44. See note 9 supra.
45. The original parties cannot appeal the granting of intervention until the case has
gone to judgment on the merits because until then their rights are not determined. Soren-
son v. United States, 160 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1947). As a practical matter, this eliminates
the possibility of relief. For a brief analysis, see Note, 52 CoL. L. REV. 922, 930-1 (1952).
46. The instant case provides an example. Plaintiffs in Clark v. Sandusky opposed
the attempt to intervene but did not defend against the appeal. Without the aid of appellee's
brief, the Seventh Circuit was persuaded to grant intervention. Intervention here will un-
doubtedly alter the character of the action, causing its emphasis to shift from the civil
rights issues originally involved to the collateral property dispute between plaintiffs and
the applicant. Mrs. DeRose has vividly outlined her viewpoint in a book, Tun CAMILLE
DEROSE STORY (1953).
If intervention were discretionary in the Clark situation, as the district court obviously
thought, it could have been denied in order to prevent burdening the original action with
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delayed considerably.47 Whatever happens, the satisfaction which the parties
derive from resort to the courts is diminished. An interpretation of "bound"
which adds to their problems can only be justified where necessary for the
protection of third persons.
But application of Rule 24(a) (2) only to those situations where the judg-
ment may be res judicata or where the alternative remedy will be of no prac-
tical value assures adequate protection to third persons. "s Although the re-
jected applicant may be inconvenienced, he can suffer no significant injury if
a practical alternative remains. The function of 24(a) (2) is to protect third
parties, not to favor them. If protection is otherwise assured, intervention
should be left to the discretion of the trial judge in order to foster flexibility
and fairness. Any rule superficially more liberal will only prove illiberal in its
effect upon federal procedure and the rights of original parties.
collateral issues. See, e.g., United States v. Bendix Home Appliances, Inc., 10 F.R.D. 73
(S.D.N.Y. 1949); Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Thompson, 8 F.R.D. 96 (ED. M1o. 1948);
United States v. 1830.62 Acres of Land in Botetourt County, 51 F. Supp. 15S (W.D. Va.
1943).
47. For example, intervention was denied by the District Court in Clark: v. Sandslt:y
on February 2, 1953. The applicant filed notice of appeal four days later, but the apeal
was not decided until July 20, 1953, delaying the case almost six months. Cf. Allen Cal-
culators v. National Cash Register Co., 322 U.S. 137, 142 (1944), where Mr. Justice Roberts
recognized the undesirability of "unwarranted appeals by disappointed applicants to inter-
vene."
48. It is consistent with what Professor Moore calls, "the underlying principle in the
development of intervention: the purpose of the courts to prevent their fprocesses from
being used to the prejudice of the rights of interested third persons." 4 Moorm I 24.03.
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